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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________________ 
 
No. 14-4814 
_________________________ 
 
TEMUR KADIROV; KHUSAN KADIROV, 
         Appellants 
 v. 
 SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;  
 DIRECTOR UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;  
 TONY BRYSON, District Director USCIS Philadelphia;  
 EVANGELIA A. KLAPAKIS, Field Office Director USCIS Philadelphia  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-13-cv-07390) 
District Judge: Hon. Gerald Austin McHugh 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 16, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed September 21, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Brothers Temur and Khusan Kadirov appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”); Leon Rodriguez, Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”); and the District Director and Field Office Director of USCIS 
Philadelphia (collectively, “the Government”).  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write exclusively for the parties, we set forth only those facts 
necessary to our disposition.  The Kadirovs’ father, Akbar, obtained lawful permanent 
resident (“LPR”) status in 2004.  The brothers entered the country in 2000 and obtained 
their LPR status derivatively through their father in 2005.  In 2008, Akbar was charged 
with fraudulently obtaining his asylum status, a crime to which he subsequently pled 
guilty.  In 2011, an immigration judge sustained removal charges against Akbar, and he 
was removed that year.   
 In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) initiated removal 
proceedings against the Kadirov brothers on the ground that they were inadmissible at the 
time of their entry because the basis of their asylum status was their father’s fraud.  In 
2012, DHS and the Kadirovs’ counsel filed a joint motion to terminate the proceedings 
without prejudice against the Kadirovs in “the interest of justice.”  Appendix (“App.”) 53.  
The motion stated that Temur would “be allowed to proceed currently for naturalization, 
these proceedings having been terminat[ed] without prejudice,” id. at 52, and it provided 
as to Khusan that “the proceedings be withdrawn without prejudice . . . .”  Id.  The 
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Kadirovs aver that their LPR cards were returned to them at the conclusion of these 
proceedings, but they do not cite to the record for this point.  They also say, without 
citation, that “[t]he final Motion to Terminate contained date-specific provisions for each 
of the family members to apply for naturalization, indicating an understanding on the part 
of the ICE attorney who entered into the agreement to terminate that the Appellants’ LPR 
status was retained.”  Kadirov Br. 28.   
The Kadirovs later applied for naturalization with USCIS, and their applications 
were denied on the ground that they had “failed to establish that [they] were lawfully 
admitted as [] permanent resident[s] of the United States as required by [8 U.S.C. § 
1427(a)(1)] and [8 U.S.C. § 1429].”  App. 177.  USCIS reasoned that because the 
brothers had obtained status through Akbar, and because Akbar had obtained his status 
fraudulently, the brothers had not proven that they were lawfully admitted LPRs.  The 
Kadirovs administratively appealed, and USCIS affirmed.  They then filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking judicial 
review of USCIS’s denial of their naturalization applications.  The parties agreed that 
their dispute was a question of law and so submitted a Joint Statement of Facts and cross-
motions for summary judgment.  The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
Government, and the Kadirovs now appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the denial of the Kadirovs’ 
naturalization applications de novo pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), and we have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
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exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, applying 
the same standard employed by the District Court.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 
(3d Cir. 2002).  That is, we “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In doing so, “we view all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc ., 620 F.3d 392, 
395 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
 According to 8 U.S.C. § 1429, “no person shall be naturalized unless he has been 
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all 
applicable provisions of this chapter.”  The definition of “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” is “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of 
residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). 
 The petitioner bears the burden of proof in a naturalization proceeding and all 
doubts about eligibility are resolved in favor of the Government.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1439; 
Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., INS, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967). 
 We have explained that “‘the term ‘lawfully’ denotes compliance with substantive 
legal requirements, not mere procedural regularity.’”  Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 
216, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441 (5th Cir. 1983) 
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(alterations omitted)).1  As a result, “an alien whose status has been adjusted to LPR — 
but who is subsequently determined to have obtained that status adjustment through fraud 
— has not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence because the alien is deemed, 
ab initio, never to have obtained [LPR] status.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alteration 
in original).2  Courts of appeals have acknowledged that, as an extension of this principle, 
an alien innocent of wrongdoing who has obtained LPR status derivatively from someone 
who has obtained his status by fraud has not been “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”  Kyong Ho Shin v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
children who were granted LPR status by virtue of their mother’s fraudulently-obtained 
status “were not substantively qualified for admission as LPRs at the time they entered 
the United States,” even though they were not responsible for the fraud); see also Walker 
v. Holder, 589 F.3d 12, 19–21 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that child who obtained LPR 
status when his grandparents falsely claimed he was their child on the visa petition had 
not been lawfully admitted to the United States, in spite of his lack of intent to defraud 
the Government). 
                                              
1 The Kadirovs argue that “Gallimore concerned interpretation of former § 212(c) of the 
INA, not naturalization.”  Kadirov Br. 19.  But Longstaff, the case we quoted in 
Gallimore, did concern naturalization, and the interpretation of “lawfully” that we 
adopted in Gallimore thus applies here. 
 
2 The Kadirovs contend that “[t]he statutory definition of ‘lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence’ is plain and requires no interpretation.”  Kadirov Br. 11.  We 
elucidated the meaning of the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in 
Gallimore, and we will not revisit that determination here. 
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 The Kadirovs argue that their case is distinct from Walker and Shin, because those 
cases involved determinations by the Immigration Courts during removal proceedings 
that stripped the children of their LPR statuses.  Here, the Kadirovs argue, they “went 
through their Immigration Court removal proceedings and emerged with their LPR status 
not having changed.”  Kadirov Br. 18 (quotation marks omitted).  They focus on the 
phrase “such status not having changed” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), and they contend that 
the aborted naturalization proceedings “left [their] LPR status unchanged.”  Id. at 16.  
Though the Kadirovs are correct that their removal proceeding ended without a finding 
that they were not LPRs, that outcome is not dispositive of their naturalization petition.  
While the removal proceeding did not strip the Kadirovs of LPR status, neither did it cure 
the underlying deficiency with the basis of that status, their father’s fraud; though the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) did not find that they were LPRs, the IJ also did not find that 
they were eligible for LPR status on any basis other than that fraud.  Thus, the removal 
proceeding did not conclude with any disposition as to the Kadirovs’ LPR status.  The 
Kadirovs contend that “if the issue had proceeded to litigation the regulations allow each 
of the family members to demonstrate their own individual eligibility to show they meet 
the refugee definition,” and so they “each would have had the option of proving their own 
independent eligibility for both the refugee/asylum and keeping their own LPR status.”  
Kadirov Br. 26.  But they voluntarily forsook this opportunity when they agreed to the 
termination of their removal proceedings. 
 The Kadirovs’ estoppel argument likewise fails.  They contend that “the statute 
and the regulations provide for the proper termination, revocation or rescission of status 
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that may have been unlawfully obtained,” and that where DHS agreed to terminate the 
removal proceedings, “the Agency is controlled by its prior decision.”  Kadirov Br. 23.  
A party asserting estoppel against the Government bears the burden of proving “(1) a 
misrepresentation by the government, (2) which [he] reasonably relied upon; (3) to [his] 
detriment and (4) affirmative misconduct.”  DiPeppe v. Quarantillo, 337 F.3d 326, 335 
(3d Cir. 2003).  The Kadirovs claim that they “relied upon the agreement to terminate 
their removal proceedings and the direct references to their eligibility to apply for 
naturalization.”  Kadirov Br. 33.  This argument fails.  In agreeing to terminate the 
removal proceedings without prejudice, DHS did not guarantee the Kadirovs’ eligibility 
for naturalization; instead, it simply exercised its discretion to stop pursuing removal.  
The termination of the proceedings did not estop USCIS from finding that the Kadirovs 
had failed to meet their burden of showing eligibility. 
 Finally, the Kadirovs argue that “[t]he Court cannot base its decision on a reason 
for Agency action that was not asserted by the Agency in its original decision.”  Kadirov 
Br. 29.  This general principle of judicial review of agency decisions — which applies to 
“determination[s] or judgment[s] which an administrative agency alone is authorized to 
make,” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) — is incompatible with the 
clear command of 8 U.S.C. § 1421, according to which judicial review of a denial of a 
naturalization application “shall be de novo.”  This argument thus also fails. 
 An applicant bears the burden of showing his entitlement to naturalization.  See, 
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1439; United States v. Szehinsky, 277 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
Kadirovs bore the burden of showing substantive compliance with the requirements for 
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obtaining LPR status.  See Gallimore, 619 F.3d at 223.  Because they could not show that 
they were lawfully admitted as permanent residents, there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to their eligibility for naturalization, and so we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
 Although this outcome leaves the Kadirovs in the precarious position of being 
LPRs who are not currently the target of removal proceedings but who cannot pursue 
naturalization on the basis of their LPR status, this is the position they bargained for in 
agreeing to terminate the removal proceedings.   
IV. 
 For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
